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THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW*
*1oN. SMEON S.

I
WILZU
S

It may prove profitable, and certainly cannot be devoid of
interest to lawyers, to trace the evolution of the law through the
processes incidental to the administration of justice, and
inherent in our institutions.
If we may fairly define our problem,, the first steps shall
have been taken towards its solution. What is law9 Definitions
abound, but in seeking the goal of the jurist, it is apparent that
the broader subject must be circumscribed by the elimination of
much that might be described as law.' Fundamentally, law is
the principle that controls the operations of the materials and
forces of which the universe is composed. It is omnipresent,
perennial, and pervades all things that can affect the senses.
It is a conception of the uniform order of sequence, for
example, the laws of motion, of growth, of gravity Law in that
sense inheres in the nature of things and dominates the physical
world. It is eternal, changeless, created "in the beginning",
and is merely discovered, not made, by man. The uniformity is
in the nature of things and there is no law outside of them to be
consulted or obeyed. As physical beings we are subject to
physical laws. In a similar sense we are governed by moral or
spiritual laws, whether or not we are conscious of it. We find
ourselves ever in the clutch of elemental laws that brook no disobedience and depend upon no human sanction.
But laws of that character are quite apart from the conception of law with winch courts are concerned in their work,
and about which lawyers contend in their daily grind in the
ordinary administration of justice. If our statutory and evolved
laws be sound, they must be consistent with the others mentioned, and, to a large extent, made by unseen hands and derived
* An address by Simeon S. Willis, Judge of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, before the West Va. Bar Association, Bluefield, W. Va.
** Simeon S. Willis, practiced law at Ashland, Kentucky, 1902-1927;
City Solicitor of Ashland, 1918-1922; member State Board of Examiners
for nearly five years; revised fifth edition of Thornton's Law of Oil
and Gas in conjunction with Judge Thornton; Judge of Court of Appeals of Kentucky since 1927.

ICompare Carter, "Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function", pp. 9-25.
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from imperceptible sources. It is in some such sense that the
saying is true that we do not make laws, but merely discover
them.
Passing the law of natural tings, the sway of moral principle, and the axioms of experience winch have the force of law,
we approach in a practical way the consideration of law as
enacted by statute, and as evolved by judicial reasomng from
accepted postulates. Such laws are necessary for the disposition
of concrete social conflicts and for the regulation of human
action in an organized society The idea of law with winch we
now concern ourselves relates to the origin and application of
the rules and regulations that govern the transactions and relations of men, formulated or accepted by constituted authority,
and enforceable by established agencies. There are, indeed, laws
that affect the lives, liberties, and properties of clients, and our
purpose is to seek the sources of those laws and to find the
foundations upon winch they are erected. As expressed by a
writer m the latest edition of the Encyclopedia Brittamea. "It
is proposed to define law for the jurist as the sum of the influences that determine decisions in courts of justice. This will be
found to satisfy the conditions expected of a working defimtion. "' 2 -What are the influences that determine such decisions 2
And how are they found, developed and determined?
The motives, springs and purposes that underlie the law
and actuate alike the legislator and the judge, are at the very
threshold of such an inquiry Demosthenes, with a finality that
approached revelation, thus described it.
"The design and object of all laws is to ascertain what is just,
honorable and expedient, and, when that is discovered, it is proclaimed
as a general ordinance equal and impartial to all. This is the origin
of law, which, for various, reasons, all are under obligation to obey,
but especially so because all law is the invention and gift of heaven,
the sentiment of wise men, the correction of-.every offense, and the
general compact of the state, to live in conformity with winch is the
duty of every individual in society."

Proceeding from purposes of that exalted character, the law
must be worked out by the jurist in an atmosphere that not only
affects, but to a large extent, shapes Ins decisions. The great
body of professional opinon, as well as public opinion in general, operates directly, albeit unconsciously, upon the mind of
2

H. Goitein.
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the judge in choosing the path he must pursue. The law journals largely are the organs of that opinion. Dissenting opinions
are addressed primarily to the judgment of the profession, and
whatever value they may possess is derived from the power of
convinced minds to influence the thinking of the judges until a
new opinion supplants the old. It is not very common, but some3
times a minority view ultimately becomes the controlling one.
It is this fact that gives vitality to the maxim that no question
is ever settled until it is settled right.4 Actuated by the purpose
to find a just rule, animated by the desire for fair play, and
affected by the pressure of the prevailing professional and public
opinion, the judge is far from being free to impose upon the
law his personal views or peculiar predilections. Yet the philosophies of the judges, the experiences upon which they depend
for understanding and enlightenment, the individual social
attitudes, are not entirely lost, but affect and color their interpretation of the influences that enter into the formation of judgments.
Over.emphasis may easily be placed on the social, political
or economic views of judges. Conviction is a characteristic of
every strong man. Without it no judge could worthily fulfill
his function. Responsibility and study are apt to sober the
most radical, as it is likely to liberalize the most rigidly conservative. If the judge has character and capacity for growth,
if his tendency is towards self-improvement, little fear of his
superficial predilections need be entertained.
Speaking of the Supreme Court Justices, a very able writer
has said.
"Of course a justice should be an outstanding lawyer in the ordinary, professional acceptance of the term, but that Is the merest beginning. Once recognize the true nature of the judicial process in
these constitutional cases, and the determining factors in the qualifications of a justice become his background, the6 range of his experience,
and his ability to transcend his experience."

And it must be remembered that the prevailing opinion m
any state of society is influenced by history, and the views of
judges vary as their knowledge of the background of the law
varies. The law has been likened to a great pool gathered from
the fountains of justice. Every legislative act and judicial
Terra? v. Burke Construction Co., 252 U. S. 529, 21 A. L. R. 186.
'Lexzngton Hydralic & Mfg. Co.-v. Otts, 119 Ky. 598.
5
Felix Frankfurter, 36 Harvard Law Review, 917.
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decision raises the level of that pool, and affects the quality and.
content of the whole, but it is equally true that the new legislation and the latest decisions are themselves affected by the fusion
with the existing body of the law. So, the law, slowly evolved
through the ages, is the fruit of many factors other than the
mere will of the actors. The function of administering justice
thus becomes an agency in the worlpng out of principles, and it
is impossible for it ever to become a mere instrumentality for
the expression or enforcement of the personal will or wish of the
judges, or of the legislators, or of both combined. And it can
never become the manifestation even of a dominant desire or
will, unless it possesses the permanence to enforce itself upon all
the influences that enter finally into the formulation of the
accepted postulates of justice. This thought is implicit in a
statement of Judge Cooley
"There will never come a time when all our laws will be in the
form of statutes, never a time when the judiciary law, wich is evolved

in, and constitutes the very act of, administering justice, will not form

a part of our legal system. It is only a question at any given time
how far it is necessary or expedient to transmute the judiciary law
into statutory form.0

But even the enactment of well thought out statutes does
not end the constructive work of the courts. Indeed, a study of
the adaptation and interpretation of statutes and their effect
upon the development of the law, will demonstrate that the work
of the judges, although often aided by enactments, has been
rather retarded by the necessity of assimilating a vast amount of
ill-considered legislation. Perhaps many legislators, untrained in
the law, are surprised, if not shocked, at the results accomplished
by their work after it has passed through the refining process of
judicial interpretation.
We may put aside, as foreign to our purpose, the simple
cases in which the result is foreordained and which are disposed
of as a matter of course without the necessity of pansing to
re-examine the foundations upon which their determination
rests. Such cases form the mass of judicial pronouncements,
and seldom touch the field where divergence of opinion is likely.
But the rare cases that offer opportunity for choice among
several possibilities provide debatable territory, and furnish the
real battlegrounds of the law. How do the Courts proceed to
6 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.), p. 64.
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determine such cases I It need not be noted, of course, that all
judges do not consciously proceed from one expendient to
another, following a system of averages or alternatives, until a
decisive formula is found, There can be no such thing as compartments in-the law, where parts may be found to fit every
need. But actually all judges are subject in some degree to the
various decisive forces that underlie all law and operate on all
having to do with its administration. Individual defects will be
discovered. Some judges may be so committed to legal theories
that decision for them is impossible unless the problem may be
assigned to some definite doctrine established by authority, at
least of some sort. Others may not be ingrained in the philosophy and history of the law, and stand ready to determine
every decision from an individual sense of what immediate
5ustice requires. There are two special types of critics that are
always abroad in the land. One set asserts that the judges who
dare to advance new doctrines, or to extend old ones, are rewriting the law and affecting, if not effacing its landmarks. Even
Lord Bacon inveighed in some such vein. The other class of
critics condemn the courts as archaic, oblivious to the demands
of justice, and bewail that they are crucifying the rights of
modern men upon the altar of some ancient outworn formula
that may have been all right in its time, but can be serviceable
no longer. These two types of judges and critics represent the
falsehood of extremes, and accentuate the inherent difficulty
in working out justice with due deference to new ideas and
events, and with proper respect for time-honored precedents.
Both types may be found in nearly every jurisdiction, and
doubtless serve a useful purpose in keeping the institution alive
to its duties, as well as aware of its difficulties. Yet it is easy to
divine the chaos that would come if they were permitted permanently to control. The true principle will be found in picking and choosing wisely from the good that has been established,
and assimilating it to the things that are found to bear the tests
of truth. It is worthy of mention that eminent authority exists
for the claim that intuitive judgment often prevails. Judge
Hutchison observed that a judge, after canvassing all the available material and vainly cogitating thereon, permits his fancy
to play a part, "and brooding over the cause, waits for the feelnmg, the 'hunch'--that intuitive flash of understanding that
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makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision
and at the point where the path is darkest for the judicial feet,
sets its light along the way
In feeling or 'hunching' out his decisions, the judge act
not differently from but precisely as the lawyers do in working
on their cases, with only this exception, that the lawyer, in
having a predeternned destination in view, to win the law suit
for Ins client-looks for and regards only those hunches which
keep hnn in the path that he has chosen, while the judge, being
merely on is way with a roving commission to find a just solu"
tion, will follow his hunch wherever it leads him.
And Judge Hutchison adds
"I must premise that I speak now of the judgment or decision,
the solution itself, as opposed to the apologia for that decision; the
decree as opposed to the logomachy, the effusion of the judge by which
The judge really decides
that decree is explained or excused.
by feeling and not by judgment, by hunching and not by ratiocination,
such ratiocination appearing only in the opinion. The vital motivating
impulse for the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong
in the particular case; and the astute judge, having so decided, enlists
his every faculty and belabors his laggard mind, not only to justify
that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster with his critics.
Accordingly, he passes in review all of the rules, principles, legal categories, and concepts 'which he may find useful, directly or by an
analogy, so as to select from them those which in his opinion will
justify his desired result' "
"A century ago a great American judge, Chancellor Kent, in a
personal letter explained Ins method of arriving at a decision." He
first made himself 'master of ,the facts.' Then (he wrote) 'I saw
where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time;
I might once in a
I then sat down to search the authorities.
while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost always found
princtples sited to my miew of the case.' ,'

Judge Cardozo formulated a fourfold division of the forces
followed and the methods applied in the best judicial work. 9
These four methods he thus classified.
1.
2.
3.
4.
tion of

The method of philosophy.
The method of history, tradition and sociology.
The methods of sociology. The judge as a legislator.
Adherence to precedent. The subconscious element in the solusocial conflicts.

In his later work dealing with the growth of law, he referred
to the classification he had adopted, and, notwithstanding some
""The Judgment Intuitive; The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial
Decisions", 14 Cornell Law Quarterly, 274.
8 Law and the Modern Mind, by Jerome Frank.
'The Nature of the Judicial Process.
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obvious overlapping, adhered to it as practically sufficient.
said.

He

"Our fourfold division separates the force of logic or analogy,
which gives us the method of philosophy; the force of history, which
gives us the historical method, or the method of evolution; and the
force of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores of the day, with
its outlet or expression in the method of sociology. No doubt there is
ground for criticism when logic is represented as a method in opposition to the others. In reality, it is a tool that cannot be ignored by any
of them. The thing that counts chiefly is the nature of the premises.
We may take as our premise, some pre-established conception or principle or precedent, and work it up by an effort or pure reason to its
ultimate development, the limit of its logic. We may supplement the
conception or principle or precedent by reference to extrinsic sources,
and apply the tool of our logic to the premise as thus modified or corrected. The difference between the function of logic in the one case
and in the other is in reality a difference of emphasis. The tool is
treated on the one hand as a sufficient instrument of growth, and on
the other as an instrument to cooperate with others. The principle
of division is a difference, not of kind, but of degree. With this reservation, the fourfold classification of methods has sufficient correspondence
with realities to supply a basis of distinction. The judicial process
will not be rationalized until these methods have been valued, their
functions apportioned, their results appraised, until a standard has
been established whereby choice may be directed to be such that the
hope to rationalize it fully, at all events in our days, will' have to be
dismissed
as futile. That is not a reason for refusing to do the best
we can.' 10

The problem of the law is perpetual, and not soluble once
for all. It arises with every new conflict of principle, albeit m
a more complex form, or in a more complicated field. The effort
to stabilize conduct and fix rights must not be allowed to hamper

progress or to hamstring enterprise.

The pool must not be per-

mitted to become stagnant, or allowed to break its bounds.

Neither the judicial nor the legislative mind can visualize in
advance every variety of human action, or every phase of the

conflict of interests, nor formulate with certainty a perfect rule
to fit every exigency
We must forever wait on experience, and
bear the loss of that necessity
On the checkerboard of events,
all the moves cannot be foreseen.

The eternal struggle of the

law is to maintain certainty and yet to avoid static, tor make
advancement without producing violence or uncertainty Stability, without stagnation, and motion without destruction, are the
horns of a dilemma between which the course of wisdom must be

charted.

The difficulty may not be denied, the struggle is

insistent and inevitable, and constitutes the supreme task that

vexes all judges.

Any principle, to possess permanence, must

10Cardozo, The Growth of the. Law, p. 62.
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work only good. And even though good may appear in some
situations to result from the operation of a rule, it may not do so
under conditions more complex. A good illustration may be
found in the history of the fellow-servant doctrine in damage
cases growing out of the relationslp of master and servant. In
its origin it obtained wide acceptance as a fair and just rule.
But as the conditions of its operation became more complicated,
it encountered conflict with accepted conceptions of what was
just, resulting first in its judicial modification, and finally in its
legislative overthrow. The Supreme Court of the United States
recently adverted to the subject in these words.
"Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are not uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably
would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which before
the advent of automobile and rapid transit street railways would have
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there Is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or
contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world it is
impossible that it should be otherwise.""

The changing circumstances in this changing world demand
a vigilant study of the processes of justice and the operation of
the rules formulated to promote it. And the study of adjustment is not avoided by the accumulated experience of the ages.
The problem of the lawyer is to predict the conclusion the
court ought to reach, and to present the facts, arguments and
authorities that tend to produce it. Indeed, a noted judge has
declared that "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.' '12
The definition is striking, but not entirely satisfactory,
without many assumptions and numerous limitations. It tends
to belittle the search for principle, supposed to permeate all
things and transactions, and which ennobles and enriches the
study and pursuit of the law. If it presupposes the presence
of a principle, whose reasoned result on any given state of facts
may be predicted, if the court itself be true to tradition, it may
not be so far afield. But the theory of Judge Cooley and the
older jurists that a decision upon a point arising in any given
uEucld v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365.
"Holmes Collected Papers, p. 173.
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case ought to be followed because it constitutes the htghest evdence that we can have of the law applicable to that point, 13 is
more consonant with our accepted conceptions. As evidence of
the law, persuasive in every case, and conclusive when founded
in sound reason and fortified by experience, the decisions of the
Court afford a standard for the lawyer in his search for the
intangible something that is understood to be the law. In one
sense, although somewhat ironic in its suggestions, "A legal
duty so called may be nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things, he will be made to suffer in this
or that way by the judgment of a court", but in reality a legal
duty is not so easily described, nor pendant upon a foundation
so precarious. A legal right is one which the organized power
of society may be employed to enforce and defend. But what
will that power enforce or defend? Duty is determined by an
innate and prevalent sense of fairness and right, or by a positive
enactment springing from that source, and it depends upon the
4
circumstances as well as the social attitude of the time. 1 Such
duty, when sanctioned by the prevailing agencies of authority,
will be enforced for the benefit of those to whom it is due.
Undoubtedly there are social duties, moral duties, and legal
duties, which have a higher sanctity than the mere supposition
or expectation that a court will inflict certain compensation or
suffering for a breach of them.
Edmund Burke wrote
"For if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of
sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken
either on their reason or their passions sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears indeed to be generally acknowledged that with regard to truth and falsehood there is something fixed.
We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tests
and standards which are allowed on all sides, and are supposed to be
established in our common nature."

If a court fails to act in favor of it, a legal right is not
destroyed. It endures. It is the court, not the duty, that has
failed. It is futile to predicate the existence of rights and
duties upon the mere means designed to protect and promote
them. If one means of protection fails, another will be found,
if the right is still respected and the duty continues to be
"'George Robertson, by Samuel M. Wilson, 4 Great American
Lawyers, p. 398.
24 Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S. W. (2d) 557.
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recognized. If the means of vindication arc inadequate or
feebly applied, the right itself may be nnpuanged, but sound
thinking will not surrender the substance because of a failure
of the form designed for its preservation. New expedients will
spring up spontaneously
The interest of the lawyer in the processes of the judges is
a practical and continmung one. Naturally and necessarily the
business of the lawyer is to win cases, and the impulse is to put
forth the factors and the features of the case that seem to-hold
the greatest promise of achieving the result desired, That fact
affords the very reason why the methods of judges must be
appreciated by the lawyer. Mr. Choate said there were two
kinds of lawyers-those that know the law, and those that know
the judge. Mr. Tutt mentioned a third kind-those that know
their fellow men. The lawyer must put himself in the position
of the judge, and put forth the efforts that tend to produce in
the mind of the judges the conviction the lawyer entertains. If
there be a sound and controlling precedent, he need go no
further than to show its applicability If one be cited against
him perhaps it may be differentiated in its facts, or distinguished
on principle. If he chances to be in direct opposition to an
authority which must be overthrown in order that he may prevail, the sole hope is in demonstrating its fallacy It is then
that he subjects it to all the tests of philosophy, history tradition, social justice and the tendency of it to conflict with other
and more compelling precedents. It will not do merely to criticise it. It is essential that some substantial reason be advanced
for its disregard. Here is the forum for the intellectual effort
that distinguishes the real lawyer. Precedents are modified,
and even overthrown, under the searching analysis and careful
criticism of lawyers. It may be an infrequent thing, but the list
of overruled cases in many states is an imposing one. If a case
does not accord with the dictates of reason and justice, it will be
subject to assault until it is brought into a harmonious relation
with the system that must work justly, in order that it may
endure. 15
The variety of circumstances under which human conduct
must be judged, and the multitude of cases that must arise,
1'Hayes vProvidence citizens Bank & Trust Co., 218 Xy. 28, 290
S. W. 1028; Williams v. Dearborn Truck Co., 218 Ky. 271, 291 S. W. 388.
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require the skillful work of lawyers and judges to keep and
maintain the proper adjustment with realities. We must have
carpenters and machanics however perfect become tools and
machinery The bar serves the bench and unless good work is
done by the lawyers, but little may be expected of the judges.
Webster's arguments at the bar were the forerunners of Marshall's opinions. The work is ceaseless as time. Models may be
found, guides may be fashioned, but the burden of work remains.
The multiplication of books does not lessen the obligations or
burdens of the bench and bar-rather the reverse.
After all the factors of reason, logic, philosophy, experience,
social ans and legal standards have served their offices, the final
responsibility rests upon those who carry on, the perpetuity of
the system depends upon the success they may attain. Our
system of law at last rests upon the tacit understanding that the
verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court constitute the
law, because under them one man's property is taken and
bestowed upon another, and men themselves are taken from their
families and fellows and confined in durance vile. These judgments must be founded upon that innate sense of justice which
is the intuitive gift of the great masters of our law.
Theorists may speculate, and philosophers may dispute, but
in practical life it is the operation of principles upon people and
their possessions that determine ultimately their justice and fix
their durability
"Justice, sir, is the great interest of man on earth. It is the liga-

ment which holds civilized beings and civilized nations together.
Wherever her temple stands, and so long as it is duly honored, there

is a foundation for social security, general happiness and the improvement and progress of our race."
"And whoever labors on this edifice, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to
raise its august dome still higher in the heavens, connects himself
which is and must be as
in name, and fame, and character, with that
durable as the frame of human society.""'

SIMEON S. WrILS,
Judge Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Frankfort, Ky.

26Daniel Webster, in his tribute to Mr. Justice Story.

